The Estimated Value of a Premium Division One Football Player: The Argument Supporting Pay for Play by Roher, Travis S
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2011
The Estimated Value of a Premium Division One
Football Player: The Argument Supporting Pay for
Play
Travis S. Roher
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roher, Travis S., "The Estimated Value of a Premium Division One Football Player: The Argument Supporting Pay for Play" (2011).
CMC Senior Theses. Paper 184.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/184
1 
 
 
     CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE 
THE ESTIMATED VALUE OF A PREMIUM DIVISION ONE FOOTBALL 
PLAYER: THE ARGUMENT SUPPORTING ‘‘PAY FOR PLAY’’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                SUBMITTED TO 
                                PROFESSOR MARC WEIDENMIER 
          AND 
      DEAN GREGORY HESS 
                                                           BY       
            TRAVIS ROHER 
   
 
          FOR 
SENIOR THESIS 
         SPRING 2011 
  APRIL 25, 2011 
2 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….3 
II. Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………4  
III. Introduction……………………………………………………………………….5 
IV. Literature Review………………………………………………………………..10 
V. Data……………………………………………………………………………….14 
VI. Results and Analysis……………………………………………………………..18 
VII. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………22 
VIII. Accumulated Data……………………………………………………………...24 
IX. References………………………………………………………………………..26 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Abstract 
 
The gap between the revenue generated by Division One football players and 
the value of an athletic scholarship is the marginal revenue product of these athletes.  
Because of the monopsonistic behavior of the NCAA, Division One institutions 
capture an economic rent from their student athletes. This paper measures the rents 
generated by NCAA Division One football players in the six powerhouse conferences 
by using linear regressions based on variables such as university revenue, future NFL 
draft picks, undergraduate population, and weekly AP Top-25 rankings. This paper 
will inform its readers on how much money these student athletes are generating for 
the NCAA and their respective schools, and will provide understanding as to why 
there has been so much controversy regarding the payment to NCAA athletes. 
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III. Introduction 
 
Collegiate athletics is more prominent in the United States than in any other 
country.  There are approximately 1200 member schools comprising the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”), which is structured into three 
Divisions (I,II, and III).  At its highest and most competitive levels, the NCAA is 
responsible for creating the excitement of the BCS Championship Game, the roller 
coaster ride known as March Madness, the aura surrounding the Heisman trophy, and 
the College World Series. The constant televised imagery of NCAA games, 
highlights, and players helps fuel the passion that lead boosters and alumni to 
extreme, and often inappropriate and illegal behavior.1 With the advent of billion-
dollar television rights contracts, there is little debate that big time NCAA Division 
One collegiate athletics is big business. 
There has been much controversy in recent years relating to payments, gifts, 
and so-called loans to student athletes and the NCAA rules prohibiting such largess. 
Is it the inherent nature of collegiate athletes to resist, bend or break the rules, or are 
the NCAA’s rules governing the conduct of today’s student athlete, in today’s 
marketplace, outdated and in dire need of change? One could argue that youth will 
                                                 
1
 “Alabama Fan Arrested for Killing Auburn Oak Trees.” Dashiell, Bennet. Business 
Insider, Feb. 17, 2011. http://www.businessinsider.com/alabama-auburn-tree-deaths-
2011-2 
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always be pre-disposed to making poor decisions, but the problem is not new and is 
exacerbated by the economics of big time collegiate athletics. 
One of the most prevalent controversies in Division One athletics is illegal 
payments to athletes. It is not rare to learn about a current or former Division One 
football or basketball player or program being suspended or otherwise penalized by 
the NCAA for accepting payments from a booster or an agent, or otherwise engaging 
in “illegal behavior”2. Recent college stars such as Reggie Bush, Dez Bryant, and AJ 
Green were all found to have accepted funds that were not NCAA sanctioned.3 Such 
allegations cast a pall not only over the offending athlete (Reggie Bush had to return 
his Heisman Trophy) but over entire Universities (USC had to forfeit its past 
championship seasons, for example).  Programs are crippled and as a result innocent 
student athletes can be left without the coaches that recruited them or the type of 
program they came to play for. It is not only the most famous college athletes who 
violate the rules, however. In an interview written by George Dohrmann for Sports 
Illustrated in 2010, former agent Josh Luchs conceded that he had paid over thirty 
college players to curry favor if and when they turned professional.4  
One of the main goals of the NCAA is to maintain the association’s amateur 
status by prohibiting the payment or the giving of things of value to its athletes. 
                                                 
2
 “College Football and Crime.” Benedict, Jeff & Keteyian, Armen. Sports 
Illustrated. Mar. 2, 2011.  
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/the_bonus/02/27/cfb.crime/index.html 
3
 “A.J. Green Case at Georgia Illustrates Hypocrisy of College Jersey Sales.” Travis, 
Clay. AOL. Sept. 8, 2010. http://www.aolnews.com/2010/09/08/a-j-green-case-at-
georgia-illustrates-hypocrisy-of-college-jers/ 
4
 “Confessions of an Agent.” Dohrmann, George. Sports Illustrated. Oct. 18, 2010. 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/magazine/10/12/agent/index.html 
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According to NCAA rules, Section 2, Title V; “It is a violation of the NCAA rules for 
athletes to accept money or gifts while intending to remain eligible.”  In light of the 
fact that many outstanding NCAA athletes come from underprivileged homes, do not 
have the financial ability to make ends meet once on campus, even with a full athletic 
scholarship, and cannot work because of the demands of their sport, one can begin to 
understand the temptations faced by an easily influenced young athlete. These facts, 
in conjunction with the gaudy revenue generated by the NCAA, which is then shared 
with the college or university as an additional revenue stream, begin to explain why 
paying certain student athletes may be justified.   
Everyone involved in the execution of a Division One basketball or football 
game-from the University athletic department to ticket vendors, hot dog vendors, TV 
contractors, coaches, referees, and field crew- are all paid. One then wonders why the 
people actually providing the services upon which all the revenue is generated are the 
only ones not compensated. The degree to which these athletes are exploited is quite 
concerning. Because NCAA athletes are not deemed workers, they are not free to 
form a workers’ union. Like all athletes, they are subject to lose their “job” at a 
moment’s notice due to injury or the whim of a coach.   
Some former NCAA athletes and state legislators are suggesting legislation 
that would allow paying student athletes a stipend beyond the value of their 
scholarship5. An athletic scholarship in Division One covers tuition, room and board, 
and in certain cases books for classes. However, most of the student’s living expenses 
                                                 
5
 “Scholarship Shortfall Study Reveals College Athletes Paid To Play.” NCPA News 
Release. March 26, 2009. http://www.ncpanow.org/releases_advisories?id=0009 
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are not covered by this scholarship. A report conducted by Ithaca College researchers 
found that a student-athlete’s scholarship is $3000 short of what former NCAA 
President Myles Brand called “cost of attendance.”6 Thus, not only are the generators 
of a billion dollar business deprived from participating in the revenue they help 
generate, they are not allowed to recover for daily living and necessary academic 
expenses for things like groceries, a haircut, a calculator, or a computer. 
As there are supporters for “Pay for Play” there are those against it, claiming a 
free education and the help of the admissions office in gaining admission to the 
university are compensation enough. However, as stated earlier, the cost of 
attendance can typically exceed the value of the scholarship, and thus, financially 
underprivileged students are still faced with economic difficulties. Furthermore, the 
full value of the scholarship they do receive is often undermined by the system itself, 
which prohibits many student athletes from attending all classes and fully 
participating in the academic aspect of college life. Indeed the value of the 
scholarship can be minimal if the student doesn’t attend class or graduate. It is an 
accomplishment today for a Division One football powerhouse to graduate half of its 
players.7 In essence, a large, revenue-generating program could place virtually no 
importance on graduating its players, yet continually win championships for its 
school, earning many millions of dollars for the institution the NCAA. Thus, this 
hypocritical aspect of the NCAA is quite striking. As the NCAA claims one of its 
                                                 
6
 “NCAA Might Face Damages in Hundreds of Millions.” Farrey, Tom. ESPN The 
Magazine. Feb. 21, 2006. http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2337810 
7
 “NCAA Football Grad Rates at All Time High, but Top Schools Falter.” Wieberg, 
Steve. USA Today. Oct. 27, 2010. http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2010-10-
27-ncaa-graduation-rates-study_N.htm 
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chief goals is “maintaining amateurism”, the NCAA seems more like a self-righteous, 
self-serving big business than an entity which truly has the best interests of its 
“workers”, the student athlete, at heart. 
If legislation is signed and Division One football players are financially 
compensated beyond their scholarship, how much money would these players 
receive? Following the model of Robert W. Brown’s empirical study, my goal in 
writing this paper is to estimate the revenue generated by a premium power 
conference (ACC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, Pac-10, SEC) Division One football 
player. Because Brown’s original data was collected prior to 1993, I updated the data 
set to account for years 2006 through 2009. With a more recent study dedicated to the 
payment and value of a premium college football player, I hope to provide some 
insight and new information on the monetary value generated by some of our 
country’s most recognized and talented student athletes and how that value can affect 
the current debate over whether or not they should be paid. 
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IV. Literature Review 
 
There are many articles, inquiries, and studies which advocate the payment of 
NCAA athletes. The study on which I modeled my paper, “An Estimate of the Rent 
Generated by a Premium College Football Player” by Robert W. Brown, measures the 
economic rents universities capture from its football players. Brown uses variables 
such as universities’ revenue, recruiting pools, national prestige, and NFL draft status 
to determine how much revenue these players generate for their respective schools. 
Brown’s “Estimate” was published in 1993 and thus may be outdated. His study 
found, at that time, a premium college football player generated over $500,000 for his 
respective team. My objective in conducting my own updated research and analysis is 
to find the current value of the revenue generated by premium college football 
players. 
John Rooney, author of The Recruiting Game suggests a change to the NCAA 
system. In his book, Rooney proposes a reform to the traditional inter-collegiate 
sports infrastructure. The revenue sports in intercollegiate athletics would become 
semi-professional franchises located within university communities. Rooney’s main 
goal is to eliminate the many problems, scandals, and investigations that coincide 
with major revenue generating programs within the confines of American 
universities. His expertise in geography allows him to illustrate many recruiting 
patterns. In my study I will be modifying one of his indices- the pool variable. As 
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defined by Robert W. Brown in his study, the pool variable measures the number of 
recruits at each major school relative to the number of recruits produced in each 
respective state. By following some of Rooney’s basic principles and practices, I was 
able to construct my own indices of recruitment and recruit population. 
The article “Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever” by 
Peter Goplerud discusses the possibility of paying a stipend to NCAA Division One 
athletes. The article discusses how these revenue-producing collegiate athletes are 
exploited on a regular basis and proposes a stipend system. Goplerud is in favor of a 
stipend, as he notes that a free education, expansion of social networks, and 
memorable life experiences alone are not sufficient payment. Goplerud discusses past 
trials regarding the NCAA and anti-trust issues. The paper also covers different legal 
issues and questions which may arise with the implementation of a stipend system for 
specified institutions.  Gender equity, labor laws, and taxation issues are among these 
issues. The NCAA and its institutions do not recognize its athletes as employees for 
workers’ compensation purposes for fear that doing so will reshape the mission of 
higher education institutions. Granting workers’ compensation could also lead to 
athlete demands for salaries, collective bargaining, and benefits, including, disability 
payments for injuries sustained during participation of team activities. 
In a related article, “Forward Progress? An Analysis of Whether Student-   
Athletes Should Be Paid”, Christopher Parent (2003) reviews current legislation in 
place for the implementation of a stipend for revenue-producing athletes. The 
argument against “Pay for Play” is addressed in the article. The NCAA’s primary 
argument against “Pay for Play” is to preserve the athletes’ amateur status. The 
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NCAA defends its athletes’ amateur status as the reason why there should be no 
payments beyond an athletic scholarship.  Parent’s article explains that the 
exploitation of collegiate athletes demonstrates the hypocritical nature of the NCAA.  
As explained in many “Pay for Play” articles, the NCAA permits teams to 
generate millions of dollars of revenue for its respective institutions but does not 
require that the players graduate. Furthermore, the true value of an athletic 
scholarship cannot and is not being realized because of the low rate of graduation of 
collegiate football and basketball players. This problem is exacerbated with longer 
regular season and playoff schedules forcing students to miss more classes. Due to 
this perceived hypocrisy and exploitation of the student athlete, there are current 
legislative initiatives in place to better voice these concerns. As stated by Parent, 
separate initiatives signed by Senator Ernie Chambers of Nebraska and Senator Kevin 
Murray of California are pushing for a “Pay for Play” proposal.  
Workers compensation is a major issue in the argument concerning “Pay for 
Play.” However, as explained in Beckham and Mondello’s “Workers’ Compensation 
and Collegiate Athletes: The Debate Over the Pay for Play Model: A Counterpoint,” 
there are some hurdles that lie in the way of payment of collegiate athletes. Advocates 
of “Pay for Play” have been largely unsuccessful in persuading state legislatures to 
reform workers’ compensation laws to include student athletes. In addition, the 
judicial system has accepted the position that collegiate athletes are not employees. 
The largest obstacle in “Pay for Play” involves anti-trust regulations. The NCAA is 
governed on an amateur status and is thus exempt from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
If collegiate athletes were granted employee status, it is possible that doing so could 
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bring about anti-trust claims against the NCAA, unions, wage negotiations, and other 
benefits.8 Institutions would also be put in a hard position if they were to pay athletes 
of revenue-generating sports and not other athletes who dedicate equivalent time and 
energy to their respective sports. 
Lawrence W. Kahn examines collegiate sports in the context of the theory of 
cartels. Many point to the attempts by the NCAA to restrict output and payments for 
factors of production as evidence of cartel behavior. Others argue that such limits 
enhance product quality by preserving amateurism. The author finds that the NCAA’s 
compensation limits on athletes lead to high levels of rents from the entertainment 
revenues produced by the athletes. The athletes producing these rents are mostly 
African- American, while the beneficiaries are primarily white. The rents are 
typically spent on coaches’ salaries, facilities, and non-revenue sports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 “Forget Utah; Alabama Could be Key To Successful BCS Anti-Trust Suit.” Staples, 
Andy. Sports Illustrated. Nov. 5, 2010. 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/andy_staples/11/05/bcs-
antitrust/index.html 
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V. Data 
 
As a measure to define how much money each school generates via their 
football programs, the first variable defined is the 2009 Football Revenue generated 
by each respective football program in the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big East, Big 
Ten, Big Twelve, Pac-10, and Southeastern Conference. The revenue of each 
program was found through the U.S. Department of Education’s website for fiscal 
year 2009. In Division One athletics, a team’s success is equated not merely by the 
wins and losses columns, but by the school’s market exposure, TV contracts, Bowl 
Game appearances, ticket sales, donations, and apparel sales.  College football has 
long been the most profitable sport among collegiate athletics. The vast amount of 
revenue generated by football and basketball programs is extremely important 
because without such revenue many non-revenue generating sports at colleges and 
universities would not be able to stay afloat. The most important factor in generating 
this revenue for the universities, as well as for the NCAA, is the athletes themselves. 
Without these athletes attracting millions of spectators and sponsors, most athletic 
programs would not only struggle to generate a profit, but certain sports would have 
to be cut from athletic departments. After looking at how much revenue is generated 
by these football programs through the efforts of the athletes, one can see why the 
claim of student-athlete exploitation is at the forefront of the “Pay for Play” debate. 
Typically, a larger undergraduate population of a university results in a 
bigger, more successful athletic program. Furthermore, large universities often have a 
strong “school spirit” as well as enthusiastic, generous alumni who feel it is their duty 
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to give back to their alma mater.  Because it is impossible to ascertain the exact 
number of fans each university has for its athletic teams, the variable Undergraduate 
Population serves as a substitute. This variable, like 2009 Football Revenue, was 
found on the U.S. Department of Education’s website for academic year 2009. 
Though most schools in the major conferences have large undergraduate populations, 
this figure does vary.  
One may define a “premium college football player” in a plethora of ways. 
Because there are so many collegiate football players in the top conferences, let alone 
all of Division One, the most suitable way to define a premium player is whether the 
player has been selected in the NFL draft. The 2006-2009 Draft Picks variable 
consists of the total number of players drafted from each respective school from 2006 
to 2009. This data was found by looking on the NFL’s website of past drafts and 
analyzing the total amount of players selected by NFL teams for the years 2006 to 
2009. In short, the more players selected in the NFL Draft, the more talented the team 
is considered. In college athletics, team skill is correlated with team success, and the 
more successful and/or exciting a team is to watch, the more revenue the team will 
generate through increased broadcasts, ticket sales, apparel sales, and other revenue 
sources.   
Throughout the course of the season, the Associated Press releases a weekly 
Top 25 Ranking, beginning the week before the first game of the season and 
continuing until a week after the BCS National Championship Game when a final 
Top 25 Ranking is released. To find a team’s average ranking, I collected each 
school’s ranking for every week from the beginning of the 2006 season to the end of 
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the 2008 season. This variable is titled 2006-2008 Average Rank.  Not only does a 
high ranking detect a more successful team, but the best high school players may be 
more likely to select a school which has been consistently highly-ranked or has won a 
national championship in the recent past. Teams who were not ranked in the Top 25 
were assigned a ranking of 26. For the variable 2009 Average Opponent Rank, every 
school’s 2009 schedule was collected. By looking at each team’s opponent’s average 
ranking for the 2009 season, the Average Opponent Ranking was found. A team with 
a relatively low numeric Average Opponent Ranking means they are playing, on 
average, more talented or successful opponents. A potential recruit can view this as a 
way to play against the best players in the country while being exposed on a national 
scale. Teams with a harder strength of schedule (a metric used in college football and 
basketball) are usually given the benefit of the doubt when selected for a post-season 
invitational or tournament. 
In Robert Brown’s “An Estimate of the Revenue Generated by a Premium 
College Football Player,” Brown uses a variable employed in John Rooney’s, The 
Recruiting Game. This variable is defined as the Pool variable. Based on the data 
which was available, I modified the name and definition of this variable, which I call 
the Exposure Ratio. Certain schools and universities enjoy an inherent advantage in 
the size and quality of the recruitment pool it can select from. For instance, colleges 
in Texas, where high school football is practically considered a religion, have 
available greater numbers of highly skilled local high school players compared to 
other regions of the country. Conversely, fewer high school athletes play football in 
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the northeast due to weather conditions and urban surroundings, typically resulting in 
less successful football programs in that area.  
Although the Exposure Ratio is very generalized, it serves as a way to 
measure the differences in recruitment among schools and also shares insight into 
how much more effort some universities must exert to land highly touted high school 
players. A low Exposure Ratio for a school infers that a school is not located in a 
high-school football crazed surrounding and a program would thus need to exert more 
effort (money, time, the passing up on comparable recruits) to sign a talented recruit. 
Conversely, a school with a higher Ratio means there is more talent near the 
university and it thus would be easier for that school to sign local athletes. 
Universities located in talent rich high school areas are more easily exposed to local 
stars, and thus may exert more effort on other aspects of the football program outside 
of recruitment. I determined this ratio by first ascertaining all the high school recruits 
for years 2007 and 2008 from each state that has at least one power-conference school 
in it. I then divided the total number of high school recruits from each state for 2007 
and 2008 by the number of power-conference schools in each state. I took that 
quotient and divided it by the number of recruits brought in to each school for 2007-
2008. For example, the state of Arkansas had 39 high school football players in 2007 
and 2008 that went on to play at a power-conference school. Because there is only 
one power-conference school in Arkansas (University of Arkansas) I took the total 
number of recruits from the state of Arkansas (39) and divided it by the number of 
recruits the University of Arkansas brought in for those two years (53). In this case, 
the Exposure Ratio is .73. 
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VI. Results and Analysis 
Once I finalized my data collection for each of the variables, I ran linear 
regressions to find an approximation of the value generated by premium college 
football players. In staying consistent in my research and analysis, I followed Robert 
W. Brown’s formation and implementation of his regressions to use for mine. The 
variable 2009 Football Revenue was used as the independent variable. Variables 
Undergraduate Population, 2006-2009 Draft Picks, 2006-2008 Average Ranking, 
Exposure Ratio, and 2009 Average Opponent Rank were all used as the dependent 
variables. The independent variable was then run against all of the dependent 
variables. I ran three regressions, as Brown did, in order to ascertain the most 
accurate value possible. The output of these regressions proved to be significant as 
the Significance-F read less than .05 in all three cases. These regressions are included, 
and all can be seen on the following page. 
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Independent Variable is 2009 Football Revenue 
 
            First Regression         Second Regression         Third Regression 
CONSTANT          75247968.8 
 
108244961.3 
 
108818127.4 
 
UNDERGRADUATE 
POPULATION 
(2009) 
         675.197 
 
592.077 
 
604.891 
 
AVG.OPPONENT 
RANK (2009) 
       -3000251.546 
 
-3002038.56 
 
-2972413.297 
 
2006-2009 DRAFT 
PICKS 
        1038657.378 
 
409652.603 
 
457243.604 
 
2006-2008 AVG. 
RANK 
 -1124192.508 
 
-1141742.255 
 
EXPOSURE RATIO 
  
-1639075.07 
 
n= 65    R 2 = .321       R 2 = .388               R 2 = .391  
 
Using 2009 Football Revenue as the independent variable and the variables 
Undergraduate Population, Average Opponent Rank 2009, and Draft Picks as the 
dependent variables, the first linear regression showed a significant model (p<.05).  
Undergraduate Population and Draft Picks were significant while Average Opponent 
Rank was not. The R-Square value is .321, which means that my data can predict 32.1 
percent of any sort of trend occurring. Using these variables, the Coefficient of 
“2006-2009 Draft Picks” resulted in a finding that premium college football players 
each generate roughly $1,038,657.38  each year. Though I followed Brown’s model, 
there are many reasons why the outputs from my regressions vary from his original 
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findings. The main reason for this is because I modified all of the variables at least 
slightly. Certain adjustments had to be made because of the fact that I am using 
different, more recent data to ensure that my results are reflective of the present time, 
and are not outdated. Furthermore, I was not able to contact each school directly to 
collect individual statistics regarding revenue sources. It was my intention throughout 
the completion of this project to conduct this study in a manner similar to Brown’s 
paper while implementing my own adaptations.  
The second regression appears to the right of the first regression. In the second 
regression, 2009 Football Revenues is again the independent variable, while 
Undergraduate Population, Average Opponent Rank 2009, 2006-2009 Draft Picks, 
and Average Rank 2006-2008 were all used as the dependent variables.  The R-
Square is .387, and Significance F is significant (p<.05). Variables Undergraduate 
Population and Average Rank 2006-2008 showed significance while Draft Picks and 
Opponent Rank did not. Based on Brown’s model, in this regression the revenue 
generated by premium players is $409,652.60 per year. This value is much less than 
that of the first regression, but as mentioned previously, that is due to the differences 
in data and modifications of certain variables.  
In the third and final regression, all variables except 2009 Football Revenue 
were included as dependent variables.  Undergraduate Population and Rank 2006-
2008 were the only variables that were significant. The estimated annual value of a 
premium football player is $457,243.60 in this regression. Interestingly enough, this 
value is only $50,000 less than that of Brown’s value despite the 20+ year difference 
in data. Though I was expecting a value much greater than Brown’s, because I 
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adhered to his model and his variables may explain why my value in the third 
regression is so similar to his original findings. Considering that I did modify my 
variables and some of the data that Robert Brown used was unavailable during my 
research process, this suggests that this may be a fair value to assign the best 
collegiate football players in the top-tier conferences. 
 Because of the large discrepancy between the first value of $1,038,657.38 and 
the lesser values of $409,652.60 and $457,243.60, I ran additional regressions to find 
the variable(s) which account for the drop in values. The variable 2009 Football 
Revenue remained as the independent variable in each of these regressions. However, 
I ran these regressions all with different combinations of the dependent variables in 
order to determine which variable or variables accounted for this difference in values. 
After running these regressions, I determined that it was variable Undergraduate 
Population which accounted for this disparity. After running the regressions which 
excluded this variable, all of the values for the estimated generated revenue were in 
the range of $501,172.89 to $552,247. I then proceeded to run regressions with the 
variable Undergraduate Population. All of these values were in excess of $1,000,000. 
It is clear that this variable is responsible for this great difference in values. By 
including this variable, the estimated revenue generated by premium football players 
is over $500,000 than the outputs of the other regressions. By excluding the variable 
Undergraduate Population, the outputs were only approximately $50,000 more.  
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VII. Conclusion 
The outputs I found for possible values of premium collegiate football players 
ranged from $409,652.60 to $1,038,657.38. The largest value I found ($1,038,657.38) 
reflects greatly increased revenues generated by big time college football programs. 
Although much greater than the value found by Brown in his work, it is not a surprise 
because of the many years between our respective research. The two smaller values 
obtained in my second and third regressions were much closer together and much 
closer to the value found by Brown in 1993. These findings suggest that the value 
generated by the NCAA Division One football athletes for their schools, although not 
as great as my first value, has nevertheless been significant and constant for many 
years.  There was a noticeable discrepancy between the first regression and the last 
two regressions. By running additional regressions, I determined that the variable 
Undergraduate Population was responsible for this.  
The debate over “Pay for Play” continues to be necessary. It is the 
responsibility of the NCAA to keep pace with athletes and the sports industry. It is a 
common occurrence to read about the payment of illegal, under the table money to 
elite college athletes. Are the athletes themselves responsible for their actions? Yes. 
But I believe a system that ignores the monetary value of an athlete’s efforts is 
severely flawed.  
 This study was motivated by my interest and passion for college athletics. 
From the outside looking in, the NCAA and its labyrinth of rules and regulations 
often make no sense to the athletes, coaches and schools it governs. Like any 
successful income producing endeavor in our country, athletes who serve as 
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generators of such a large revenue pool should be entitled to participate, in at least 
some way, in the fruits of their labor. The payment of a stipend to these athletes not 
only would cover the cost of necessary items not covered by a scholarship, but at the 
very least would take away the excuse that under the table money is needed to make 
ends meet.  I believe some sort of compensation is definitely in order.  
 One of the primary goals of this paper was to find an estimated monetary 
value of the amount of revenue some of the best collegiate athletes generate for their 
schools and the NCAA. All top-tier football programs have many people who 
contribute to their successes. While many non-athletes contribute to the success of a 
big time college athletic program, none contribute more so than the players 
responsible for the competition itself. The insight gained from researching and 
analyzing recent data concerning college football shows the significant sums these 
athletes generate for their schools. It is up to the NCAA and the supporters of “Pay 
for Play” to continue this important debate until the time when the value generated by 
these athletes approximates the value of what they receive in return.  Only then can it 
be said that such big time athletics are not exploitive of the athlete.   
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VII. Accumulated Data 
          School 
Total Revenues 
2009  
Undergraduate Pop. 
(2009) 
‘06-'09 Draft 
Picks 
2006-2008 AVG 
Rank 
EXPOSUR
E RATIO 
2009 AVG 
OPP Rank 
  Boston College $19,184,902  9,501 10 20.39 0.383 24.54 
         Clemson $30,994,503  14,326 14 21.70 0.777 24.09 
         Duke $16,109,324  6,400 0 26 0.601 22.69 
      Florida St. $18,958,861  27,513 17 23.70 2.01 22.69 
    Georgia Tech $24,870,064  12,351 12 23.60 2.48 23.53 
     Maryland $11,540,368  24,520 12 23.85 1.3 24.20 
     Miami 
(FL) $24,631,029  9,268 18 25.33 1.93 19.66 
     UNC $22,077,550  17,267 8 25.58 0.58 22.92 
     NC State $22,018,738  21,840 13 26 0.505 23.88 
     Virginia $19,004,653  13,849 15 26 1.15 22.78 
     V.T. $31,155,870  23,052 21 17.79 0.866 21.82 
  Wake Forest $10,227,922  4,511 10 23.79 0.641 23.823 
     Cincinnati $13,325,304  18,128 10 23.89 1.565 24.05 
       
Connecticut $14,400,371  16,240 7 25.95 0.302 23.77 
     Louisville $15,537,276  11,855 15 18.72 0.392 23.88 
     Pittsburgh $22,513,336  16,690 12 25.20 1.25 24.22 
     Rutgers $19,494,261  27,537 10 22.16 2.14 23.71 
South  
Florida $16,562,391  22,563 4 21.93 2.01 23.02 
     Syracuse $19,152,691  12,731 8 26 0.547 22.48 
 West 
Virginia $29,467,612  20,260 7 11.97 0.14 23.92 
     Illinois $25,301,783  30,319 5 25.62 0.86 22.01 
     Indiana $21,783,185  30,983 4 26 0.438 22.28 
     Iowa $45,854,764  18,319 12 24.43 0.207 23.16 
     Michigan $63,189,417  25,261 18 17.87 0.795 22.32 
    Michigan 
St $44,462,659  33,238 10 24.87 0.833 23.60 
     Minnesota $32,322,688  27,636 6 25.66 0.5 24.06 
      
Northwestern $22,704,959  8,499 3 25.83 1.102 23.65 
     Ohio State $63,750,000  37,629 27 5.37 2.11 22.44 
     Penn State $70,208,584  37,077 18 18.68 1.52 23.65 
     Purdue $18,118,898  30,306 12 26 0.407 23.52 
     Wisconsin $38,662,971  27,145 14 18.64 0.47 23.65 
     Baylor $14,355,322  11,880 4 26 2.11 24.44 
     Colorado $26,233,929  24,774 9 26 0.583 22.54 
     Iowa State $19,974,924  21,081 4 26 0.183 23.60 
     Kansas $17,885,176  18,809 4 20.56 0.489 23.12 
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  Kansas State $17,570,624  16,413 7 25.93 0.351 23.61 
    Missouri $25,378,066  22,325 11 16.70 0.96 22.62 
    Nebraska $49,928,228  17,737 14 23.95 0.283 24.05 
    Oklahoma $58,295,888  17,131 18 7.79 0.524 21.79 
  Oklahoma 
St $32,787,498  15,266 4 22.75 0.43 23.22 
       Texas $93,942,815  35,107 22 8.60 2.2 24.32 
  Texas A&M $41,915,428  35,344 9 25.39 2.25 22.56 
  Texas Tech $26,201,009  22,048 8 19.75 2.25 21.22 
     Arizona $24,398,253  26,989 11 26 0.6 22.10 
 Arizona State $29,587,236  45,490 11 21.62 0.48 22.81 
   California $24,421,437  24,796 16 19.08 1.717 21.35 
    Oregon $29,505,906  16,942 16 18.62 0.2 23.06 
   Oregon St. $19,056,237  15,041 13 25.83 0.2 21.81 
   Stanford $21,309,949  6,564 7 25.16 2.194 25.27 
     UCLA $22,298,856  25,772 7 26 2.394 22.88 
      USC $29,080,117  15,984 37 5.16 2.135 22.82 
  Washington $33,919,639  28,052 3 26 0.44 21.67 
 Washington St. $12,754,541  18,620 5 19.06 0.451 22.98 
    Alabama $71,884,525  21,552 12 26 0.88 22.86 
    Arkansas $48,524,244  13,534 12 23.50 0.734 19.84 
    Auburn $66,162,720  18,385 17 18.31 0.8 21.91 
    Florida  $39,053,219  31,133 17 6.64 2.01 24.35 
    Georgia   $70,838,539  24,551 22 13.87 2.07 20.63 
   Kentucky $31,161,247  17,549 5 26 0.302 21.70 
      LSU $68,819,806  21,376 12 8.02 1.35 21.22 
  Mississippi $28,409,774  11,972 7 26 0.594 22.61 
 Mississippi St $14,551,275  13,206 2 26 0.516 19.08 
 South  
Carolina $58,266,159  18,881 0 23.81 0.598 21.14 
   Tennessee $56,593,946  19,686 15 20.62 0.69 21.15 
   Vanderbilt $22,506,492  6,729 5 25.39 0.989 20.83 
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